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3Foreword
In October 2009 I was invited to join a Liberal Democrat working group.
The task of the working group was to prepare a paper about policy
development and party priorities. The Facing the Future working group was
asked to produce a document with the same name. It was to be put to the
Liberal Democrat Autumn Conference when it convened in September
2011.
The motivation for establishing the working group appeared
straightforward. By the time of the 2011 Autumn Conference a General
Election would have taken place and the party would have arrived at a
point in the electoral cycle when plans for a wide ranging review of existing
policy and party priorities would have the best chance of capturing the
attention of the party’s conference representatives and engaging them in
debates, which had a realistic prospect of shaping the next General
Election manifesto.
I doubt I was alone, at least amongst the party members invited to join the
working group, in assuming that the Liberal Democrats would remain an
opposition party. The creation of a coalition and formal agreement on a
programme for government, to be implemented by Liberal Democrat and
Conservative parliamentarians, seemed - in October 2009 - a remote
prospect.
Of course, when the working group held its first meetings in the autumn of
2010, members of the working group were constrained in ways they could
not have predicted when the working party had been established. The
coalition agreement, which had been negotiated at break neck speed in the
days following the General Election, had transformed the political
landscape.
The outcome of the General Election of May 2010, which brought the
Liberal Democrats into government, has had a profound effect on party
policy making. Apart from the unfamiliar disciplines of collective
responsibility, imposed on the party’s leading parliamentarians, who had
become ministers, there was an understandable and widely shared anxiety
about the way in which differences over policy were expressed. More
important still was the stripping away of staff members who had been paid
for out of Short money
1
. The loss of staff, with a vital role in supporting the
Liberal Democrats analysis of public policy and the development of its own
policies, can only be described as a body blow. Trade unions and
millionaires don’t give to the Liberal Democrats in the way that they do to
the party’s rivals. Loss of Short money was part of the price paid for
4entering government.
The working group’s activities, constrained by the party’s entry into
government and the loss of experienced support staff, were also affected
by uncertainties and ambiguities about its role. How would its deliberations
and recommendations fit into the electoral cycle and the business of the
Coalition? This time there is an unusually definite end point to the
parliament. The coalition agreement sets the date of the next General
Election as ‘the first Thursday in May 2015’.
While I acknowledged the constraints, uncertainties and ambiguities that
inevitably accompanied coalition government I found the reluctance to
publicly question several cornerstones of Coalition policy - and one in
particular - an intolerable fetter on the deliberations of the working group
and also on the preparation of its eventual report. For that reason I decided
that the most appropriate way in which to voice my own opinions and play
my part in encouraging a more robust debate about future policy making
was prepare a short paper of my own. A document in which I could
concentrate on what I regarded as the core issues. A document in which I
could press the case for putting the horse, economic recovery, before the
cart, instead of the other way round, by treating austerity as a political
totem.
For that reason the first of the core issues with which I am concerned, in
what follows, is the formulation and implementation of economic policy. As
has become increasingly apparent the Coalition mantra that there is no
alternative to accelerated deficit reduction, routinely offered as evidence of
an unshakeable resolution, has turned out to be a stake driven close to the
heart of the UK’s economic recovery.
The second core issue concerns the structure of British politics and the
extraordinary concentration of power in Westminster and Whitehall, and the
increasingly destructive detachment of governors from the governed.
Despite coalition promises to the contrary there is no good evidence that
the Westminster and Whitehall status quo been disturbed or will be
challenged. Government rhetoric about devolution and decentralisation is
mostly an empty vessel.
The third core issue has to do with the way in which the party continues to
analyse and address major environmental questions. Although there is a
high level of agreement within the party about the scale and severity of
environmental threats Liberal Democrat environmentalism has garnered
much less public support than the party had hoped for. A political fact which
the party needs – but has failed - to come to terms with.
5How and How Not to Face the Future
If Liberal Democrats are to face the future they will need not only to be far
more radical than they have been hitherto but to think much more radically
about the relationship between modern day capitalism, especially financial
capitalism, and society. Liberal thinkers and those who have been
sympathetic to Liberalism have done that in the past but our party appears
to have lost its way and urgently needs to rediscover and build upon the
political and economic thought to which it is heir.
We will not be able to face the future with any real confidence if we fail to
acknowledge a threefold threat to liberal democracy and to the prospects
and well-being of the citizens of liberal democratic societies, including
Britain. The first of the threats, which we need to understand much better
and to face up to, concerns the increasingly poisonous and destructive
relationship between a mutant and extraordinarily powerful arm of financial
capitalism and the social market economies which have been fashioned by
Liberal and Democratic parties in the world’s most economically developed
and politically sophisticated societies.
The second requires us to address a great threat, one that is particularly
closely linked to the partiality that governments have shown to financial
capital and associated media baronies. The threat is to the institutions,
executive and elected representatives of liberal democracies. There is a
profound and growing threat to the legitimacy and authority of the state in
liberal democratic societies. The threat, which is all too apparent in the
United Kingdom, is at its most severe in the most powerful and globally
significant liberal democracy, the United States.
The third threat is compounded by the first two and it is the most
fundamental. It is an existential threat to liberal democracy, but one that,
from the perspective of many citizens, grows imperceptibly. It is a threat to
the future prospects of liberal democracies - not just those who live within
them but all those who currently live outside them. It is the threat to our
common environment, which arises most obviously from anthropogenic
climate change but goes far beyond the release, by industrial and
industrialising societies, of increasing amounts of carbon dioxide into the
Earth’s atmosphere. It is the threat of unsustainable human societies
arising directly from environmental damage and depletion and, ultimately,
the threat that ecological systems, upon which all of life depends, will be so
badly damaged that the prospects of liberal democracy and liberal and
democratic societies will be irreparably harmed.
Liberal Democrats had the good sense and the foresight to commission a
6group of party members to help guide the party’s efforts in determining how
it should approach its future policy making. The members of the Liberal
Democrats’ Facing the Future working group were invited to identify the
most significant policy challenges the party faced
2
. They were invited to
think as clearly and as boldly as they could about how those challenges
should be addressed by the party, most especially in the three years
between 2011 and 2015.
I was pleased to accept the invitation I received to join the working group
and keen to make a contribution to its work. I was, nevertheless, concerned
that the deliberations of the working group would be constrained and
unduly affected by two things: the extraordinarily limited professional
resources that were directly available to the party to inform and support
policy making and widely shared anxiety about a process that had the
potential to embarrass the Coalition in advance of the next General
Election.
I had already come to the view that the loss of so-called Short money,
which supported the party’s policy development and analysis in parliament,
when it was in opposition, and the entirely appropriate circumspection that
ministers needed to show when using the resources of the civil service to
support party policy development, had exacerbated a problem afflicting all
of Britain’s political parties - not least the Liberal Democrats: How to
support high quality analysis of a kind that makes it possible to question
and test party dogma by challenging what JK Galbraith called conventional
wisdom
3
? I had also come to the conclusion that the entirely
understandable sensitivity of senior party members to the potentially
embarrassing political fall-out from open disagreements, openly voiced in
official party policy papers, added to the pressure on working groups, such
as the one I was involved in, to strive for an artificial consensus and
downplay dissent.
Because of these difficulties – indeed the impracticality given the timetable
and party political considerations – of accommodating dissent, as well as
my own disagreements with the identification and presentation of both the
challenges and the responses to them, I found myself being pushed to
produce a separate document, which I hope large numbers of my fellow
party members (and others) would read and consider alongside Facing the
Future. I have titled this document How and How Not to Face the Future.
The title signals my intention to address not only differences over policy but
– and this is in many ways far more important – differences over how
Liberal Democrats should go about identifying, and then deliberating, the
Threats and the Opportunities, as well the party’s policy making Strengths
and Weaknesses.
7Liberal Democrats are fortunate in having a vast treasury of Liberal thought
upon which to draw. They also have another treasure house, contemporary
social and scientific research, which they can raid in order to inform their
discussions of policy issues and choices. Whatever the virtues of common
sense and our strong attachment to conventional wisdoms, about such
things as deficit reduction, it is quite likely that what we take to be excellent
good sense is nothing of the sort. In a remarkable book the scientist and
engineer turned sociologist, Duncan Watts, points out that fresh, informed
and detached research, about social, economic and political issues, often
throws up surprising and challenging results
4
.
Liberals are – and certainly ought, given their enlightenment origins, to be -
defined by their willingness to consider new facts and new arguments as
well as by a willingness to re-examine what has been taken for granted.
Our Liberal open mindedness is vital, not only to our ability to avoid
repeating previous mistakes but also to prepare for a future that will almost
certainly differ radically from the past and about which, inevitably, great
disputes rage and uncertainties abound.
8Trend Spotting
At September’s conference in Birmingham Liberal Democrats will be invited
to face the future. But almost all of those who have been invited to help set
a clear direction for the party’s future policy making will in fact be telling
fellow Liberal Democrats to stick rather than twist and, in effect, to hold
their nerve. They will disdain fundamental questioning of the party’s current
role in economic policy making within the Coalition and its fraying
environmentalism. Above all else party members will be encouraged to
steer clear of the party’s radical traditions in policy-making, for fear of
upsetting the Westminster applecart.
This is deeply regrettable because it is hard to exaggerate the significance
and long term ramifications of the economic convulsions that swept across
the world in 2007 and 2008 (and which continue to reverberate
internationally). No one – though the temptation in government to do so
must be immense – should underestimate what our recent and current
economic woes portend for liberal democracy in Britain and around the
world
5
. It will be no easy task to face up to the scale of the challenges that
have been and are being generated.
It is all too apparent that political leaders – Liberal Democrat as well as
Conservative and Labour - are reluctant to look much beyond the
immediate task of patching things up. Most have failed to address, at least
in public, the underlying causes of the economic dislocation and financial
disorder that gave rise to an unprecedented bust.
Unfortunately, what Richard Florida has called the Great Reset
6
has and
can be expected to go on stimulating conservatism within our own party
and others. There is a great desire – especially amongst the Liberal
Democrats’ political opponents - to return to business as usual and to
restore a Westminster scene in which the terms of political trade have been
little affected by either coalition government or financial calamity. Liberal
Democrats should in fact be playing the leading role in resisting such a
return, and what amounts to a liberal retreat in the face of social, economic
and environmental failures that are certain to intensify unless there are far
reaching reforms.
The strength of the desire to go back – rather than to face up to a radically
different future - reflects three things:
i. a deep reluctance to acknowledge how fundamentally western liberal
democracies, including our own, have been affected by economic,
environmental and social changes compounded by – rather than
driven by - the credit crunch;
9ii. an understandable – but inexcusable – refusal to get to grips with
changes that have had a long gestation, and have impoverished our
politics, disrupted markets and weakened social ties; and,
iii. a very great failure of political imagination.
It is the failure of political imagination which most seriously handicaps
Liberal Democrats who want to develop and to communicate the ideas and
policies that are required to face the future.
Any political party seeking to organise and mobilise its own supporters -
and through them the electorate - must set out to show that it understands
why the world is the way that it is. If it is a radical party – and that is what
Liberal Democrats must surely aim to be - it also needs to be ready and
willing to explain why it champions reform and how its reforms can be
realised. A radical political party’s raison d'être must be to provide the
ideas and the arguments - as well as the detailed policy proposals - needed
to persuade a sceptical public that it not only recognises and understands
what’s going on and going wrong but possesses the vision - as well as the
values - needed to make things better.
However, one of the most striking things about Facing the Future, the
Liberal Democrat Consultation Paper and the working group report of the
same name, is the absence of any overarching analytical framework or set
of political ideas capable of helping party members - or indeed the
members of the Facing the Future working group itself – make sense of the
multiple challenges which Liberal Democrats insist British society must now
face up to.
For readers of Facing the Future there can be no doubting that Liberal
Democrats have strong values, which they are keen to restate; they are
proclaimed in ‘Our Values’. Far less apparent is the ability and willingness
of Liberal Democrats to offer their own account of why the world is
changing so rapidly and troublingly. ‘Our Values’ isn’t, unfortunately and
quite revealingly, matched by a section headed ‘Our Explanations’. Is that
because Liberal Democrats lack explanations for the way in which society
is changing? Is it because Liberal Democrats cannot agree amongst
themselves what is going on and going wrong? Is it because the party lacks
the confidence to put forward its preferred explanation(s) for what is
changing and challenging? Readers of Facing the Future might be forgiven
for thinking so.
10
In fact, for those Liberal Democrats who are prepared to go in search of it,
contemporary social and economic research and, most especially, liberal
scholarship, turns out to be richly rewarding. Will Hutton’s Them and Us:
changing Britain – why we need a fairer society
7
, is just one of a number of
recent and outstanding contributions to political and economic debate. Will
Hutton, James Galbraith
8
, Richard Florida, Richard Wilkinson and Kate
Pickett
9
, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger
10
, and many others,
brilliantly integrate social and economic analyses and succeed in providing,
whether or not that was their intent, critical support for a distinctively and
unapologetically liberal point of view.
The party’s Federal Policy Committee called upon the Facing the Future
working group “to adopt a strategic, disciplined and focused approach to
renewing” the party’s policy. It interpreted its commission to the working
group as a direction to spot ‘major trends’; a brief that was hitched to two
other tasks. The working group was asked to comment specifically on the
political challenges likely to be generated by the ‘major trends’ it had
identified, and to go on to advise the party about how it should formulate
party policy to meet them. The working group was not asked to seek,
provide or assess explanations for the ‘major trends’ it had spotted. While it
was encouraged to seek out “expert evidence”, about the ‘major trends’ it
had identified, it was in no position to form judgements that it could share
with the party about what was actually driving change or the origins of the
social and economic problems it had been asked to consider.
The absence of any clear focus on accounting for the challenges it was
asked to advise the party about wasn’t just a serious omission from the
Facing the Future working group brief. It was the source of a fatal flaw in
the way in which the working group went about doing its work and
preparing its report. Debate was constrained and the contribution of the
working group to future party policy-making was seriously circumscribed.
Search as they might, members of the party looking for robust and
distinctively Liberal Democrat analyses of:
x British economic failure;
x growing social inequality;
x limited social mobility;
x persistent gender inequalities in pay;
x halting progress in meeting the challenges of energy and food
security;
x mounting public cynicism about democratic politics and media
reporting;
x faltering progress in recalibrating Britain’s foreign and defence
policies;
11
x contradictory and botched public service reforms;
x limited success in stimulating investment in new technologies; and,
x deficiencies in reforming the criminal justice system;
will not find them in Facing the Future.
The working group was well intentioned and diligent – aren’t all such
Liberal Democrat endeavours? It succeeded in identifying major trends
likely to pose severe challenges to government. But, in the absence of the
work needed to fashion an emphatically Liberal Democrat perspective on
policy failure and the genesis of our current social and economic travails,
the working group was destined not to produce a convincing or politically
distinctive narrative about the changes and challenges we face. The
working group failed, in other words, to play its full part in helping the party
to frame the political agenda and prepare the ground for public debate
about the policies that are likely to prove most important and politically
significant in advance of the next General Election.
Despite the deliberations of the working group Liberal Democrats still lack a
coherent and politically engaging account of their own about what is
happening to British society. Where does the party stand when it comes to
making judgements about raising or lowering marginal tax rates for the
wealthiest Britons, and why? What view does the party – as opposed to the
Treasury and BIS - take about the balance to be struck between monetary
and fiscal stimulus in efforts to revive the British economy, and why? What
ground does the party occupy – as distinct from DECC - when it comes to
investing in new and in green technologies, and why? Will the party remain
wedded to accelerated deficit reduction, even if economic recovery
continues to falter? Does the party have a clear position of its own – based
on its own analysis of the state of British capitalism and the condition of the
financial sector in the UK – enabling it to respond confidently to the
recommendations of the Vickers’ Commission
11
about the future of banking
in Britain?
Unless Liberal Democrats are confident that they have their own view of
the great drivers of change in our society how can they develop and
present a genuinely Liberal Democrat prospectus for political and economic
reform? It simply isn’t good enough to make an inventory of challenges and
attach a shopping list of policy reviews. What’s more, and what makes the
failure so distressing, is that it was eminently possible to do better.
12
Economics in a Great Reset
Is it possible that the credit crunch of 2007 and 2008 wasn't an ordinary
recession? There have been a number of post-war recessions affecting the
British economy but in none of them have British banks been within hours
of being unable to honour the cash demands and withdrawals of their
account holders. It is necessary to go back in time to 1920s and 30s to find
a financial calamity on a similar scale to the bust of 2008. One of the
greatest Liberals of the 20th century, John Maynard Keynes, was impelled
to write the most important work of 20th century economic theory in order
to explain the failure of the economic system in Britain (as well as
internationally) to recover from a general collapse in demand, that was both
domestic and international
12
. That period, known as the Great Depression,
wasn’t simply a repeat of earlier periods of economic turbulence. It was
qualitatively different and the failure of the economy to recover challenged
economic thinkers. Few of them, other than Keynes and those with whom
he worked most closely, rose to the challenge.
In the 1930s Keynes, who admitted his own struggle to break free from
conventional economic notions, concluded that unaided Britain's economy
would remain depressed for many years and go on failing to employ
millions of Britons who wanted to earn their own living and contribute to the
nation’s prosperity by doing so. He developed a new economics, to help
him explain what was going on and going wrong, and then struggled, with
limited success, to get policy makers to pay attention.
Richard Florida in his book The Great Reset compares the crash of 2007/8
with the Great Depression and before that the Long Depression of the
1870s. These were times, like the present, when the magnitude of
economic and social change had precipitated crises that threatened the
social and economic fabric of the societies affected by them. Many of those
affected were baffled by how dramatically their own lives and the lives of
those around them were changing. A small number of individuals, who
were unusually strongly motivated and well placed to reflect on what was
happening, offered explanations for the crises that had overtaken their
societies.
In the annals of social and economic research Karl Marx, Joseph
Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes standout as observers and thinkers
who were especially well equipped and strongly motivated to share their
insights into the convulsions which not only threatened but appeared to be
capable of turning entire societies and their economies on their head.
When many of the smartest and most liberally inclined of the current crop
of economic and political analysts, Florida amongst them, are convinced
13
that we are undergoing a similar social and economic transformation the
least we can do is listen carefully to what they have to say and make our
own considered judgements about the relevance and validity of what they
have to say.
No single thinker is likely to have a monopoly of understanding but it is
clear that some observers of the crash of 2007/8 and what led up to it have
a better appreciation than others of the causes and consequences of wide
spread market failure. Amongst those with what can be described as
broadly liberal sympathies the economists James Galbraith, Paul
Krugman
13
, Joseph Stiglitz
14
and Richard Koo
15
are preeminent. All of them
have urged the governments of the world's wealthiest liberal democracies
to do more, much more, to counteract the economic forces which they have
concluded had been at work for many years and now inhibit economic
recovery, as well as adding to our social and economic woes.
Of course Richard Koo, and others who have sympathised with or
propounded his notion of a balance sheet recession
16
, have encountered
resistance to their economic arguments and their policy nostrums. Much of
the resistance comes from more conservative members of their profession,
who insist that the only way to restore the health of Western economies,
with very high levels of public and private debt, is to concentrate on
eliminating deficits in the public sector (even if households are
simultaneously doing all they can to pay down their own debts). Although it
sounds contradictory enthusiasts for austerity economics (‘expansionary’
fiscal contraction), many of them found in the Treasuries of advanced
economies, have been quite adamant that economic strategies aimed at
accelerating the reduction of public sector deficits will aid economic
recovery rather than inhibit it. George Osborne, the Coalition’s Chancellor,
is a prominent member of that club. Indeed Mr Osborne is signed up to
what appears to others to be an oxymoron: economic recovery is best
supported by expediting the process of fiscal consolidation.
At an event organised by the Social Liberal Forum in June, held at City
University, I attempted to set out, in broad terms, the case for slowing down
rather than accelerating the process of fiscal consolidation in Britain
17
.
Vince Cable, who had accepted the Social Liberal Forum's invitation to
debate economic strategy and Liberal Democrat priorities with me, took a
strikingly different view. He insisted that the coalition government's plan A,
even though it might conceivably be improved by modest adjustments and
become a plan A+, should not be the subject of any truly radical revision.
There was, I don’t think I am being unfair in paraphrasing him, no
alternative. When I went on to argue, using Koo’s presentation of monetary
14
data for the UK, that monetary policy had simply lost traction, as Keynes
would undoubtedly have argued, Vince appeared unmoved.
While Vince made it clear that he was aware of the work of Richard Koo he
stated, quite baldly, that he did not accept what Richard Koo had to say
about what was needed to counteract recession in either the United States
or the United Kingdom. Vince did not explain why he thought Richard Koo
was mistaken. Richard Koo himself has been at great pains to explain not
only what a balance sheet recession is and how it arises but also to put
forward a policy response to it. His analysis and recommendations are
supported by extensive and meticulous empirical work.
In my presentation to the Social Liberal Forum I presented Koo's analysis
and conclusions in the most direct language I could find. Koo himself has
been remarkably generous in sharing his findings and his policy
recommendations. There is simply no good reason why economic policy
makers in any country should not invite Koo to set out the case for fiscal
policies which build on Keynes’ original insights, in The General Theory of
Interest, Employment Money
18
, and then test their austerity economics
against Koo's case for countercyclical stimulus, in the depths of a balance
sheet recession.
Koo's analysis, which contains a great many insights dependent on his
close and detailed knowledge of Japan's economic troubles, is
complemented by an impressive and exceptionally thorough analysis of the
relationship between government debt, economic growth and
unemployment in the United Kingdom, undertaken by Victoria Chick and
Ann Pettifor. It is entitled The Economic Consequences of Mr Osborne
19
.
The title is a quite deliberate reminder of Keynes' assault on the economic
ignorance and obduracy of Winston Churchill, who insisted on a truly
disastrous return to the gold standard in 1925. What Chick and Pettifor
show is that "...increased government expenditure [in the UK] has
[historically] led to both higher nominal and higher real GDP [and that]
policies that supported employment and public debt improvements were
not detrimental to inflation". It is an extraordinarily important finding and
confirmation that current Coalition economic policy is taking the UK in the
wrong direction.
The mute refusal to engage with those who disagree with Coalition
economic policy, a public policy approach that prefers Tina (there is no
alternative) to Tara (there are real alternatives), ought to be deeply
disappointing to all those Liberal Democrats who believe that in order to fix
a problem it is essential to begin by understanding it. Koo's proposition that
economic psychology, in a balance sheet recession, leads households and
15
corporations to become obsessed with paying down debt and building up
balances also leads him to conclude that an active government is vital to
recovery. Yet a government committed to boosting demand, in such
exceptional circumstances, runs headlong into the kind of dogma - about
the efficiency of markets and the superiority of private investment over
public investment - that was personified by Alan Greenspan. Personified
that is until Greenspan admitted, too late, that he had discovered a flaw in
his economic philosophy.
All those who find Richard Florida's notion of a Great Reset, in which the
foundations of an economic and social system are violently shaken, of
more than passing interest, are likely to be open to other ideas which add
to their sense that social and economic systems around the world are
currently being subjected to great and mounting stresses which, rather like
those associated with plate tectonics, have built up over time and are liable
to be suddenly and dramatically released.
One of the great expectations of liberals and of democrats is that open
societies will, in time, become fairer and freer. There is a shared
expectation that as the social and economic chemistry unleashed by
political action to enhance individual opportunities gets to work the life
chances of the poorest and most disadvantaged citizens will be
transformed. This isn't simply an American dream it is a liberal dream - a
dream that is at the heart of truly liberal and democratic societies. If birth is
destiny or becomes destiny, in a liberal democracy, then liberal democracy
loses much of its legitimacy. Liberals and democrats will then have good
reason to fear the restoration of aristocracy.
It is now commonplace to point to falling rates of social mobility and to
reports of rising social and economic inequality. Jan Pen's Parade of
Dwarfs (and a Few Giants)
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, which was published in 1971, represented
differences in incomes in an imaginary parade. Citizens were ordered in
great ranks – most of them stretching as far as the eye could see. The
ranks consisted of all those who shared the same income – represented by
their height in relation to the average (that is the statistically mean) income.
Pen's parade was organised to take an hour to pass. All of those who went
by in the first half hour appeared to be well below average height. The
average (the mean) income was shifted to the right by the very high
incomes of the very best paid. Pen's point was that when height is used to
represent income we enter a world mostly populated by pygmies, with a
very small number of giants. Those whose incomes, represented by their
height, place them in the row of people with the mean income are high
earners by the standards of most others. If Pen's parade took place today,
rather than in 1971, the very small number of giants would be noticeably
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taller, and the differences between the height of ordinary citizens – most of
them below the mean height in the parade - and an extraordinarily favoured
economic elite, whose heads are literally in the clouds, would be even more
striking.
Income inequality, which grew rapidly both before and during the Great
Depression, has grown rapidly since 1971. The gap, between rich and
poor, which reduced in the 1950s and 1960s, now signifies a return to
economic inequalities that scarred the 1930s. Mounting income inequality –
not to speak of inequalities in wealth, is a measure of the stresses and
strains that have been growing - contrary to the expectations of liberals - in
the world's most developed and politically sophisticated societies.
James Galbraith, an authority on economic inequality and political change,
has coined the term predator state
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to describe polities and political
economies in which the private affluence of a small number of citizens is
sustained and is likely to be increased by public policies and an economic
architecture over which they, the richest members of society, have
disproportionate influence. That influence depends on the capture of
regulators and public policymakers, by corporate and financial interests. It
is well matched to the kinds of casino capitalism that have thrived in the
United Kingdom and, most of all, in the United States since the beginning
of the Reagan presidency in 1981.
Liberal Democrats, who want to understand and explain increasing
disparities between rich and poor, widespread social exclusion and a
myriad of other social and economic ills, must be prepared to embrace the
economic and political arguments of James Galbraith and others. They
have good reason to believe that capitalist societies, unaided by liberal and
democratic governments, are far less capable of spreading opportunity and
sharing prosperity than liberals had hoped would be the case. The interplay
of culture, party political competition and markets has been much less
socially and economically progressive than British Liberals (and now
Liberal Democrats) had hoped and expected. From a Liberal Democrat
perspective the big battalions, especially the most commercially successful
corporate interests, have been much more powerful than Liberal economic
and political theory encouraged liberals to believe would be the case.
Failure to acknowledge that hinders our efforts to develop and improve our
party's policies.
Quite apart from the evidence that social and economic inequalities have
been growing, Liberal Democrats need to be aware of epidemiological
research that has greatly enhanced understanding of the impact that
inequalities - not simply unequal social and economic opportunities - have
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on health and well-being. Embracing that research is vital if, as a political
party, the Liberal Democrats want to explain why they support policies
which don't simply aim to improve access to public services for the poorest
but advocate measures which, to paraphrase the words of Richard
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, reflect a recognition that the quality of each life
depends on the active pursuit of liberal equality
22
, not just equality of
opportunity.
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No Room and no Sense at the Top
It is surely self-evident that democracy, at least the kind which Liberal
Democrats long for, cannot be said to exist if political parties and political
institutions are unrepresentative of and unaccountable to the electorate.
Yet the case for claiming that Parliament and the political parties
themselves are unrepresentative and unaccountable appears to be
incontestable. In the course of a BBC documentary
23
, first broadcast at the
end of January 2011, Andrew Neil set out to answer two questions: Does a
narrow social elite run Britain? and, assuming the answer is yes, Why is
political power so heavily concentrated in the hands of an unrepresentative
minority of Britons?
Neil had little trouble answering his first question. In one clip from the
documentary, which was as close to being a personal testament as any
BBC documentary is ever likely to be, he appeared to announce the death
of both democracy and meritocracy. They had lost out in a rigged contest
with English public school elitism and the class divide, of which private
schooling was emblematic. Neil put it to Sarah Teather that the social and
educational exclusivity of the Coalition government, with 12 out of 119
ministers coming from just one school, Eton, and 66% having been
privately educated (which he pointed out compared with just 7% in the
general population), was a travesty of representative politics. Sarah
responded by saying that such unrepresentativeness was not good for trust
in politicians or the political system. She agreed with Neil that something
needed to change; but wasn’t given the opportunity, at least on screen, to
say what.
Neil was primed to move on to the next stage in his argument: The ladder
of opportunity - which he knew from personal experience had existed in the
1950s and 60s - and which he believed had begun to make British politics
more meritocratic - had mostly disappeared. The result was that the
products of Eton, Westminster and Oxbridge now monopolised the top
positions in government. When it came to advancing the causes of
representativeness and openness British politics had failed. Britain was in
fact going backwards. Grammar schools, which Neil believed had been the
key to economic, social and political mobility, had disappeared in many
parts of the UK. That meant that bright young men – he suggested that this
meant clever people much like himself, but who hadn’t had access to a
grammar school education - found themselves outside looking in, because
they couldn’t gain access to an exclusive circle made up of Oxbridge
educated former public schoolboys and an even more exclusive set at
Westminster who facilitated careers in national politics.
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Gary Elsby, who had been denied an opportunity to contest the Labour
nomination for the parliamentary seat of Stoke-on-Trent, was then
questioned closely by Andrew Neil about his failure to get through to
Labour’s local selection contest for the seat. Elsby told Neil he had no
doubt that he lacked the characteristics that had come to count for far more
than local knowledge and commitment to the policies and principles of his
party. He was not Oxbridge educated, like Tristram Hunt, who had been
selected and then elected to represent Stoke-on-Trent in the House of
Commons as a Labour MP. Neither was he a friend, as he put it, of Lord
Mandelson.
The social and educational distance, to which Gary Elsby attributed his
political failure, was, Neil suggested, the key to understanding socially and
educationally exclusive Westminster based politics. The Liberal Democrat
minister, Sarah Teather, had acknowledged that it was hard to trust elected
representatives who were overwhelmingly unrepresentative of their
electors. Neil was able to point to a social elite – quite possibly a self-
perpetuating elite - who appeared to have restored their control of key
political institutions, most particularly central government in Whitehall and
the parliament in Westminster.
There can be little doubt that with the decline in deference, and increased
social, educational and economic distance - between representatives and
represented - we now have a fertile soil for public suspicions about the
motives and character of MPs and ministers. The parliamentary expenses
scandal was an additional incendiary, which further jeopardised public
respect for Parliament. It is hardly surprising that the murky world of media
manipulation, most especially what the British public have been
encouraged to believe takes place in a self-serving Westminster bubble,
where political careers are made and broken, and lobbyists, activists,
analysts, researchers, civil servants and journalists engage in an elaborate
dance with one another, has come to frame and fan the flames of suspicion
and distrust.
When Liberal Democrat MPs, who had made great play, at the General
Election, of their pledge to oppose any increase in university tuition fees,
found themselves supporting a government that had decided to
substantially increase university fees a phenomenon, well known to social
psychologists, came into play. It further eroded trust in politics and
politicians. And, while it is particularly painful for many Liberal Democrat
voters and supporters, it is representative of what happens when politicians
appear detached from the lives and aspirations of those they say they are
trying to represent
24
.
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The social psychologist Paul Slovic
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, who has written extensively about
trust and democracy, has emphasised the fragility of trust in his published
work. In the course of his exceptionally long career as a psychological
researcher Slovic has had good reason to underline what he refers to as
the asymmetry of trust: trust is ‘typically created rather slowly, but it can be
destroyed in an instant – by a single mishap or mistake’. The psychological
mechanisms, which Slovic has studied closely and which appear to govern
how easily trust is lost, imply – however unfairly – that politicians who
disappoint are unlikely to be given a second chance. When, as Slovic has
put it, ‘negative events are more visible’ a single lie or accident has a
disproportionate impact on public perceptions. This is a source of grave
concern and a profound problem in contemporary public life because trust
lubricates and simplifies government and its absence greatly complicates it.
If the efficient and legitimate conduct of government depends on trust and
trust, which is fragile in any event, is weakened, as the distance between
those who govern and are governed increases, the authority needed to
govern may also be weakened (and even lost) if those who govern are
unable to identify with the population they claim to serve.
Andrew Neil thought he had identified a vital ingredient which had, for a
time, begun to open the British political system up to all the talents. He
suggested that his thesis - that the grammar school was an engine of
opportunity, for a time, in a society that had became more competitive,
meritocratic and egalitarian - was supported by the arrival in Number Ten of
Margaret Thatcher, John Major and James Callaghan. As the state
education system became less selective the ascendency of an elite, who
had been privately and Oxbridge educated, was re-established with the
arrival of Tony Blair, David Cameron and Nick Clegg in Downing Street.
Neil was right to suggest that something had changed and that something
important had been lost. But the vital ingredient needed to build and
maintain a more open and representative parliament, which has been
adulterated and diluted, is something that is close to the heart of Liberal
Democrats. It has had a much greater impact on the decay of British
political culture and the loss of political opportunity in recent times than the
organisation and reorganisation of the secondary education system. It is
the decline of local self-government.
The emasculation of local democracy and the erosion of local government
powers – matched by increasing centralisation of power in Westminster
and Whitehall – undermined the political equivalent of the repertory theatre
in acting, the start up company in business and the mutual society in self-
help. The real training ground for elected representatives, political
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innovators and policy entrepreneurs, is local government. A healthy and
vibrant political culture, attracting participants from every section of society,
can only be maintained if local government is sufficiently independent and
competent to attract people with the enthusiasm and drive to serve their
own community and the conviction, based on the life they have shared with
those they set out to represent, that they will be able to do so.
The voices that we hear in parliament and particularly from the front
benches on both sides of the House of Commons have, as Neil argued,
been recruited from highly specialised nurseries located in Oxford and
Cambridge, and in Westminster. Those who gain entry to these select
nurseries have little need of roots, apart from those they put down in
London and were blessed with at birth. As long as political power is
concentrated in Westminster and Whitehall political life – at least in
England - will become increasingly concentrated there and increasingly
detached from the rest of the country.
The shock registered in the faces and the voices of leading Westminster
politicians at the recent disorder in London and other English cities isn’t
evidence that political leaders don’t care. It illustrates something much
more troubling and, in the long run politically significant: many of our
leading politicians don’t understand their own society; they are simply out of
touch with other Britons.
The Liberal Democrat commitment to devolution and to local self-
government isn’t simply a reflection of Liberal Democrat principles. It is a
necessity if Liberal Democrats want to show that they are sincere about
reinvigorating British political culture and rebalancing the British political
system. When Gordon Lishman and Bernard Greaves wrote, in 1980, in
The Theory and Practice of Community Politics, that community politics
was an ideology - a “system of ideas for social transformation” - they had in
mind forms of political action that were intended to engage and empower
individuals and social groups from every part of British society
26
. They
were proselytising for a fertile political soil in which motivated and capable
individuals, from every part of British society, could learn to represent
themselves, their friends and neighbours and become engaged in ever
wider political communities, without becoming detached from their own
community roots.
However difficult it is to accept, and it is unpalatable to many of the Liberal
Democrats who have found their way to Westminster, shortcuts to national
power, for a radical, liberal and democratic party, risk undercutting the
political culture that is required to build and maintain an independent
political force in a society where organised interests don’t simply set out to
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capture regulators but to capture the state. Lishman and Greaves could
not have put it more clearly and, for members of the party whose primary
focus remains on pulling the increasingly discredited levers of power to be
found in Westminster, more discouragingly:
“If elections and the holding of elected office become the sole or even the
major part of our politics we will have become corrupted by the very system
of government and administration that community politics sets out to
challenge. The process will have displaced the motivating ideas. We will
have lost our reason for fighting elections at all”.
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‘Post-Environmental’ Politics
Conventional and undoubtedly well-intentioned accounts of the magnitude
and urgency of environmental challenges have sought to concentrate our
attention on the scale of the threats to our way of life and to the lives of
future generations
27
. It is an approach which ought to have considerable
political traction but it has become increasingly evident that it does not.
Two leading environmentalists who recognised that, Michael Shellenberger
and Ted Nordhaus, dismayed members of the environmental movement in
2004 when they published a pamphlet with the deliberately provocative
title: The death of environmentalism: global warming politics in a post
environmental world
28
. Their conclusion was that environmentalism was
failing not because of a lack of determination and dedication to
environmental causes by environmentalists, the people with whom they
had been allied for most of their adult lives, but because it had adopted "a
complaint-based approach to politics".
The political failure of the environmental movement and its "doomsday
discourse" should be contrasted, according to Nordhaus and
Shellenberger, with the success of Martin Luther King Jnr’s inspiring
rhetoric in his "I have a dream speech"
29
. Where the environmental
movement had failed, King had offered "an inspiring, positive vision that
carried a critique of the current moment within it". Nordhaus and
Shellenberger invited the audience of environmentalists they were
addressing to "imagine how history would have turned out had King given
an "I have a nightmare speech".
Liberal Democrats have tried to respond to such criticism of
environmentalist politics but the party’s preferred levers of political change
are still those of the environmental movement, which took its lead from
Rachel Carson, whose Silent Spring
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was published in 1962. Carson set
out to alarm her readers and, at the same time, to foster a sense of
responsibility, built upon sound science, which would help them to develop
both the environmental understanding and the conscience that was
necessary to campaign and take on the role of responsible stewards.
Stewards of a natural world threatened by human ignorance and
selfishness.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger explained, in their essay and then in Break
Through: from the death of environmentalism to the politics of possibility,
published in 2007, how they slowly came to the painful realisation that the
politics of environmental protest and of environmental limits, which had
enjoyed considerable success in the 1960s, 70s and 80s - when it fought
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smog, acid rain and helped to halt the release of chlorofluorocarbons -
wasn’t equipped to deal with global warming.
For some thirty years, along with other members of the environmental
movement, Nordhaus and Shellenberger, had viewed global warming as
primarily a problem of pollution control. They understood the
environmental and political problems of climate change through a scientific
lens which concentrated attention on ever more sophisticated measures of
pollution and prescriptions for limiting emissions. These limits were to be
negotiated and then, after they had been agreed by international treaty,
enforced by national and international authorities.
In 2003 their growing doubts about the adequacy of the political analysis,
upon which calls for national and international regulation depended, finally
brought about a breach with friends, colleagues and fellow campaigners;
people whose commitment to the cause wasn’t in doubt and who had spent
a lifetime in environmental lobby groups championing the politics of limits
and of responsibility.
They decided it was time to reject an analysis of environmental politics,
which relied on louder and ever more dramatic announcements about
impending environmental catastrophe. They wanted to supplant what they
had concluded were uninspiring rallying cries, about setting and imposing
limits, with a new kind of post-environmental politics. The flagship of their
post-environmental politics in 2003 was something known as the Apollo
project. They hoped that the “Apollo would be the vehicle for telling a
powerful new story” about inventive and self-confident societies.
Investment in clean energy would be presented not simply as desirable and
possible but a vital part of an intelligent plan to achieve energy
independence and achieve economic success. They believed that all those
who were repelled by an unceasing politics of limits would be attracted by a
politics of possibility.
Having begun their lives as environmental campaigners, who were
convinced that the most important goal of environmentalism was to
persuade the public that things could only get worse, at least in the
absence of private and public repentance, they had concluded that popular
support for actions, which had a good chance of actually mitigating and
managing climate change, required a hopeful and uplifting rather than
apologetic vision.
There was, they insisted, a puzzle, which fellow environmental
campaigners had refused to address. Why hadn’t earlier environmental
successes supplied a winning formula for combating global warming?
Their somewhat paradoxical answer was that prosperous societies and
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people have the greatest potential to be generous and outward looking, but
their society, the US, had changed. It had become a society that was
characterised by economic and status insecurity. Insecurity fuelled
suspicions and resentments, which militated strongly against
environmentalism.
Public attitude surveys of the kind reviewed at some length in Anthony
Giddens’ The Politics of Climate Change, testify to a general public
sympathy in Britain with the aims of climate change campaigners. They
also make it clear that popular support for those aims is superficial.
Ecological concerns are weakly rooted and have very little political traction,
compared to public anxiety about such things as unemployment and crime,
access to housing, education and health care. Nordhaus and
Shellenberger have made similar points about the state of public opinion in
the United States.
Giddens offered an explanation which, somewhat hubristically, he labelled
the Giddens’ Paradox
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. Paradoxical or not the point that Giddens makes
is an important part of the armoury of insights that any political party
requires if it wants to identify and address the challenges of climate
change. In Giddens’ words: “Since the dangers posed by global warming
aren’t [that] tangible, immediate or visible...However awesome they appear,
many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about
them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred
to serious action will, by definition, be too late."
If Nordhaus and Shellenberger and Giddens are to be believed,
understanding public perceptions of and changing attitudes to climate
change and climate change policy is every bit as important as
understanding and accurately reporting the science of global warming.
Inspiring messages and depressing accounts of the causes and
consequences of climate change vie for public attention. What should a
political party, interested in facing the future, make of all this?
While there are some grounds for optimism to be found in Facing the
Future, for example the section on environmental issues is entitled
challenges and opportunities, the emphasis is quite unmistakeably on what
has gone wrong and on what, without urgent action, can be expected to get
much worse.
Facing the Future has its full quota of stark warnings:
x Carbon emissions increased more last year than ever before -
resulting in the highest carbon output in human history;
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x Scientists have predicted rising sea levels, more frequent and
powerful storms, shifting rainfall patterns, more flood, drought and
food shortages;
x We should anticipate mass migrations from the worst affected areas
of the planet, generally the poorest populated parts of the globe, to
developed countries;
x There will be combinations of deleterious effects on human societies
as health and economy suffer alongside the deteriorating physical
environment;
x We are simply not doing enough to halt let alone reverse the
ravaging of the natural environment, which accompanies our
environmentally irresponsible and profligate use of natural resources.
And, what Facing the Future refers to as "massive opportunities" can,
rather too easily, be made to appear somewhat puny alongside the threats
associated with climate change, energy insecurity and intensified
competition for scarce resources.
However, readers who look elsewhere for inspiration will find it. There are
thoughtful, inspiring and exceptionally well informed authors. People with a
message about human adaptability and inventiveness and the capacity
societies have to solve problems by cooperating. One of the most
enthusiastic and well informed – who is also a willing guide - is James
Martin. His The Meaning of the 21
st
Century: a vital blueprint for ensuring
our future
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, is something a tour-de-force when it comes to exploring and
explaining how human qualities, allied with science and new technologies,
equip us not only to survive but to prosper. The keys to our flourishing,
according to Martin, are the very same qualities which enabled our
ancestors to survive and prosper. Martin is confident that they will help us
negotiate the rapids of the 21
st
century and that they could make it the most
remarkable and successful century in human history.
Regular readers of Science Daily
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and New Scientist will have no difficulty
in finding evidence of groundbreaking scientific advances and awe inspiring
technologies. In virtually every field of science human ingenuity is revealing
ways in which human beings can prosper and develop without threatening
the destruction of critical eco-systems. There are literally dozens of
potential Apollo projects in which innovation, funded privately and publicly,
by green investment banks and conventional investment banks, could
secure new jobs and help to build the platform human beings need to live
better and more sustainably.
Technologies as diverse as:
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x Hydrogen fuelled engines (under development by BMW in German);
x Solar and wind powered desalination (under development in the
United States);
x Biofuel production from wastes and from the sea (able to rival other
sources of energy and under in investigation in Hungary, Wales and
Canada)
x High temperature superconductivity (which could be deployed in
many different fields (under investigation in Japan and the UK); and
x Crop species with deep roots that can significantly reduce
atmospheric CO
2
(being studied in the UK at Manchester University);
all
form part of a long and growing list of scientific advances and technological
innovations to set alongside the warnings and dire predictions.
There can be no certainty about the success of any single new technology.
The journey from an individual’s scientific imagination, theoretical
speculations and scientific laboratories, to breakthrough technologies, is,
by its very nature, unpredictable. But there is every reason to believe that
the accelerating rate of scientific development and technological innovation
holds unparalleled opportunities for societies that are willing to support
institutions and enterprises which promise far far more than a financial
return.
Will Hutton reminds his readers, in Them and Us, that science and
technology perform best in environments that valorise independent thought
and intellectual rigour, rather than purely commercial goals. While Hutton
admires “Free wheeling private firms like Google and 3M” and knows how
highly they value original research “and would dearly love to generate
some themselves”, he is also aware that “they have been unable to mimic
the lawns, incentives and culture of the University...[where there is little
temptation] to override the autonomy and preferences of the researcher.”
“Only the University”, he writes, “can make and deliver the promise of
genuine blue-sky, paradigm-changing research”.
And it doesn’t stop there. As Ha-Joon Chang explains, in his 23 Things
they don’t tell you about Capitalism
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, the economic and social
environments in which new technologies can be most quickly and
successfully introduced are not necessarily those driven by the
unrestrained pursuit of private profit. Chang make a persuasive case, when
he argues that planning, public investment and even an absence of
economists, can contribute to the success of enterprises that have
government approval and support for developing and deploying new
technologies. There are times when scientific and technological progress
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depends on public bodies, rather than investment banks and other sources
of risk capital. Many Liberal Democrats recognise that.
While Joseph Schumpeter popularised the idea that key advances in the
economic life of a nation depend on a process of creative destruction,
Richard Florida, who is praised by Anthony Giddens for doing so, nails his
colours to a different mast.
“Florida, who has written extensively on the subject, argues
persuasively that the creative sectors of the economy - where
innovation, lateral thinking and enterprise flourish - are increasingly
becoming the driving force of the economy as a whole. Florida rejects
the idea that creativity - the capacity to innovate, to question
conventional wisdom - is limited to the few. Creativity is a 'limitless
resource… It's a trait that can’t be handed down, and it can’t be
owned in the traditional sense.' R&D investment is important, but in
pioneering responses to climate change, we need to be bringing
science, the Universities and social entrepreneurs closer together."
(Giddens, p. 108)
Such excitement and open mindedness and attention to the political
importance of public attitudes is hard to find in Facing the Future but it
surely has a vital place in the future that Liberal Democrats desire.
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Afterword
What is necessary for a political party that wants to face the future?
At least three things:
x An open and robust method for developing its policies. In order for a
serious political party to develop that it requires the means to
integrate diagnosis and analysis successfully with policy prescription
and implementation. It requires a method that makes the best use of
the ideas and information that are available.
x A means of ensuring that leaders, members and supporters
communicate clearly, regularly and confidently with one another.
x The capacity not only to say what the party believes needs to be
done and why, but also to do so engagingly and persuasively.
By these tests Facing the Future fails.
The analysis and diagnosis of the UK’s economic woes is pitifully thin and
skewed by the desire not to challenge austerity economics openly because
it is perceived as the most important pillar of the Coalition agreement. Such
an approach can hardly be described as open or robust.
When it comes to representing its own members and supporters the party
has lost its way. It is necessary to acknowledge that and to face up to it.
Far too late the party’s leaders, who set out to own all of the Coalition’s
policies, decided that they had taken ownership of some of the wrong
things and that they would be stronger, politically, if they owned (and
represented) the policies that the party’s members and supporters wanted
them to. Great bravery was shown in retreating, under heavy fire, from a
pledge that was freely given, but either the pledge or the retreat, or both,
were profoundly misguided. The retreat and the need for it was in fact a
function of the extraordinary distance that had developed between those
most heavily invested in the Westminster bubble and those to whom the
bubble has become increasingly alien and grotesque.
The arts of persuasion are not so gentle. Just look at US politics for
confirmation of that fact. But a serious political party must work hard to be
persuasive and Liberal Democrats must learn to be much more persuasive.
There is a lot to learn from Kevin Dutton, the author of Flipnosis
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. Liberal
Democrats who want to persuade potential supporters how to face up to
the future would do well to dip into Flipnosis. Dutton identifies five elements
needed for ‘persuasion [with] an incubation period of seconds’. He has an
acronym to help his readers remember them: SPICE. It’s a good idea to
begin with surprise, ideally something that makes your listener open up and
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even gets them to laugh. Simple messages are best – so keep it Simple.
And simple messages, which appeal to their Perceived self-Interest, are a
vital part of a winning proposition. Of course, to make your proposition work
you need to show Confidence; show that you really believe in what you are
saying. Finally there is Empathy, a vital ingredient intended to assure your
listener that you can see things from their point of view.
The biggest challenge for environmental policy makers isn’t persuading
others that the problems we face are immense and that it will take an
exceptional commitment to address them. The biggest challenge is
persuading others that doing so is not only the right thing to do but
something that it is in their interest to do. The simple truth is that we have
been investing too much of our energy in messages that other Britons have
heard many times before and don’t particularly want to hear again. We
have invested too little time and effort in finding and presenting the ideas
and arguments that are capable of persuading them that we regard them
as the solution, rather than a part of the problem.
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